An Outline of the FCC Subsea Cable Regulatory Landscape: Part 1

The FCC's authority to regulate subsea cables is grounded in the 1921 Cable Landing License Act. The legislation's language is vague. Hence it is open to interpretation. In late 2025 the FCC issued a very long and tedious-to-read 214 page ruling that clarified its stance on a number of important issues. The document is attached to this post.

1. The FCC via the 1921 legislation is responsible for issuing licenses for cable landings on any American territory whether a State, territory (like Puerto Rico) or island. It regards any subsea cable that lands on US territory and traverses non-territorial waters as requiring an operating license. Any cable that remains within US territorial waters is exempt. See https://www.fcc.gov/cable-landing-license-act. Many carriers disagree with the current FCC interpretation. They argue that any cable connecting two points of United States territory is exempt. Not surprisingly, the FCC has rejected this view. It has pointed out that it would mean that it has no regulatory authority over cables connecting Alaska to the Continental US or Guam to Hawaii or the US.

2. The agency requires a license for any entity owning 5% or more of the cable. The idea is that significant ownership equates to some control or influence over the cable's operation.

3. The end points of a subsea network are defined as the location of the SLTEs. This accommodates the fact the open cable model is now standard due to hyperscaler dominance and that the CLS has been effectively downgraded in most cases to a power feed facility.

4. The standard license term is 25 years. No other options are available.

Natural security is at the top of the FCC's priorities. This means that any hostile actors should not have significant ownership or control over any subsea cable that lands in the US. Right now this includes any carrier or corporate entity domiciled or under significant influence of a country on the US foreign adversary list: Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea, Macau, and Hong Kong. The US Commerce Department issues the list.

The New Cold War heated up during the 2010-2013 period. Lots of factors played a role. Successful American surveillance of international Internet and phone traffic led to the realization that other nations might try to do the same thing to the US. 😀 There were also a number of cases in which carriers such as Vodafone found software back doors into Hauwei networking gear that remained despite repeated requests and Hauwei assurances they would be removed. A big factor was Xi's increasing political repression in China, his subversion of Hong Kong democracy, and claim that the South China Sea, which the International Court ruled to be international waters, belongs to China. Other factors included new Chinese security laws. These laws required everyone on Chinese soil to cooperate with Chinese security agencies. There are no exceptions or recourse to the justice system.

Seal of the Federal Communications Commission


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