Subsea Cables & Internet Infrastructure

`This article reflects discussions I have had with war planners, government officials, policy analysts, and subsea cable colleagues.  1. A striking fact is that there is no compelling evidence of subsea cable outages due to sabotage since the end of WWII. Subsea cables are poor terrorism targets. Terrorists create terror by killing and maiming people and damaging highly visible and important infrastructure like bridges, skyscrapers, prominent buildings or sites having symbolic importance. Intentional damage of a thin cable buried two meters deep in the English Channel does not have the shock value or cause sufficient disruption by itself to justify the great effort of clandestinely locating and severing it. Secondly, there are so many cables now that sabotage of one or two has little impact on voice or data traffic. RIPE analysis indicated that a country like Estonia experienced little layer 3 degradation despite losing subsea cables landing in the country or adjacent Finland, a r...

In general, the American Digital Giants care a lot about protecting their customers from third party eavesdropping because it would undermine customer confidence in their services. Apple has refused on occasion to cooperate with the FBI when the latter has tried to get access to encrypted Iphone messaging or Icloud storage in criminal cases. Similarly, Google introduced Gmail encryption to protect its end users privacy from third party sniffing.  I have heard repeatedly through the telecom grapevine that the OTTs were not happy with the British Snooper Law. This uncontrolled mass surveillance provided another strong reason to build subsea cables that bypass the UK in order to directly deliver Continental Europe destined traffic. As a result, we have Marea, Dunant, Amitié, and now Anjana connecting Virginia Beach, Boston, and Myrtle Beach, South Carolina to France & Spain. Let me quote from a UK human rights group: "The UK has the most intrusive mass surveillance regime of any ...

At the beginning of the third millennium almost all Trans-Atlantic cables directly linked the US or Canada to either Ireland or the UK. Flag North landed at Northport, New York, and Bude, UK. Hibernia North (EXA North) was a rare exception. It came ashore at Halifax and also in Southport, UK. Yellow touched ground on Long Island and at Bude. AC2 came ashore also at Brookhaven and Bude. Hibernia South (EXA South) landed in Halifax and also at Dublin. Finally, Apollo North touched ground at Brookhaven and Bude. Clearly this is inadequate physical diversity in terms of landing points and cable landing stations. It is highly cost effective because subsea cables can share common terrestrial infrastructure, but cost and resiliency are sworn enemies. There is almost always a tradeoff. Almost all Trans-Atlantic traffic went to the 9th floor Telx facility at 60 Hudson and the 111 8th Avenue data centre in Manhattan. In London the destination was almost invariably the Telehouse North and East da...

A total of 9 cables land on the beaches near the small town of Bude, UK. There are four operational cable landing stations serving them in the Bude, UK area: two Vodafone CLS, a Colt (former Lumen) CLS, and a BT facility. Please click on https://lnkd.in/gGAP3QMA for a plethora of photos of the cable landing stations. The map illustrates the tendency for telecommunications networks to lack adequate physical diversity to ensure resiliency. Sometimes a laissez faire regulation is not the right approach. Most back haul fibre from the cable landing stations to London probably traverses the single road parallel to the beaches. See below.  When I worked at Hibernia Atlantic as an exclusive sales contractor, we cited the concentration of cables at Highbridge and Bude as good reasons to purchase capacity on the Hibernia North & South cables. North lands several hundred kilometers above Cornwall and at Halifax on the North American side. It was a compelling sales ptich. These cables toda...

Microsoft has filed an application to do a geophysical survey for a new subsea fibre optic cable connecting Ireland to the UK. The Irish Maritime authority has blessed the application. Tuskar is the name of an Irish lighthouse located on a rock in the Irish Sea. It was the first Irish facility to be powered by electricity. The cable's tentative design is to land at Kilmore Quay on the Irish side with the British landing at Newgale in Wales. Again, I expect a 96 fibre pair unrepeated cable system.  Some of my readers have expressed skepticism that Microsoft would be building its own cable when there have been several carrier builds across the Irish Sea in the last five years. EUNetwork's Rockabill unrepeatered cable has 96 fibre pairs; it went live in 2019. Aquacomms CeltixConnect-2 cable is an unrepeatered system that went live March 2022. And that's not at all. Zayo has 24 fibre pairs on the power cable Interconnector East-West.  But here's the thing. I don't think...

Type of Cable System: Repeated Two-Core Fibre Pairs With Coherent Optics  Consortium Members: Independent Operator. Construction Status: Design and Fund Raising Stage.  Number of Fibre Pairs: 48.  Number of Cores Per Fibre: 2. Estimated RFS: 1st or 2nd quarter 2027. Day One Aggregate Throughput: 13 Pbps.  Salient Features: 48 Pair repeatered cable directly linking UK, Norway, Demark, Germany, and Netherlands. Every fibre optic path is direct and involves no third country transit. Each fibre pair strand has two optical cores instead of the standard one.  Supplier: NEC. Only NEC offers multicore fibre strands and 48 pair repeaters.  I interviewed today one of the project's founders, Eckhard Bruckshen. The IOEMA cable is designed to reduce the dependence of European telecommunications traffic on the Denmark bottleneck as the map below illustrates. Today Denmark is the primary telecom bridge between the Nordic countries of Norway, Sweden, and Finland (also the ...