Subsea Cables & Internet Infrastructure

The telecom industry is gently nudging our fearful government leaders who think Russian incompetence has reached the point that they would use a Chinese cargo ship and its anchor for sabotage. I strongly urge the Russian intelligence to sue Western leaders for slandering their professional competency.  If Russia wanted to damage a subsea cable, they would use timer charges and the ship's crew would be a thousand miles away in Moscow drinking vodka and feasting on Beluga caviar when it exploded. Just like the Ukrainian special forces which probably blew up the Nordstream 2 pipeline to ensure all Russian gas to Europe goes through the Ukraine. They rented a Russian ship which was over 800 kilometers away in international waters when the charges were triggered. See https://blog.telegeography.com/what-to-know-about-submarine-cable-breaks? for the full article. 

Both cables has been repaired, namely the one connecting Lithuania to Sweden and the C-Lion system as well. The emerging consensus within the European subsea cable community is that the German, Finnish, and Estonian authorities are wrong in claiming sabotage. Anchor dragging is a very crude form of sabotage and in this case the Chinese ship Li Peng crossed 13 cables and only damaged two. Secondly, a key requirement of sabotage is a safe get away. A heavy, slow cargo ship is not a good getaway car. Furthermore, the European press got it wrong when it claimed the ship captain is Russian. It is a Chinese ship with a Chinese captain. I have written an article explaining why the sabotage accusations are so flimsy in my opinion: https://subseacables.blogspot.com/2024/11/american-officials-say-no-sabotage-in.html. The ship dragged its anchor probably to steady itself in bad weather and turned off the transponder because the captain knew what it was doing was irresponsible. I suspect the l...

A subsea cable is like a long piece of string. Except the world's cables total about 1.5 million kilometers. Anything shaped like that is inherently indefensible. The Big Huff and Puff is that if we place sensors on or near the cables, presto, problem solved. Not a chance. All it takes is a technologically sophisticated and patient adversary to send out unmanned drones to locate the cables in deep sea where they lie exposed on the ocean's floor. Record the coordinates or drop a homing beacon. When the war is about to go from cold to hot, release underwater drones with charges to attach themselves to these cables and blow them up.  Sensors are of limited value because no country or military alliance has sufficient vessels to station them close enough to every point of possible attack. What is the point of a warning if it is too late to avert the attack? The invention of radar did not stop air strikes or render air power useless. Satellites can give 30 minutes warning of a nuclea...

CNN reports that two American government officials say the most likely explanation for the outages is simply irresponsible behavior in the form of a Chinese cargo ship dragging its anchor. This contrasts sharply with German and Finnish officials who have insisted on sabotage. My own take is that the Americans are right. Nothing about the sabotage hypothesis is convincing.  There is no recorded incident of state sabotage of subsea cables since WWII's end.  Fishing boats and cargo ships dragging their anchors are responsible for approximately 70% of outages with the balance due to events such as debris slides in subsea canyon, loss of power, subsea earthquakes causing mudslides, etc. Historical data provides no examples of state targeting of subsea fibre optic infrastructure.  Most subsea cables are buried 1 to 2 meters deep to prevent damage. So locating them is difficult even for cable repair ships. Repair of the subsea cable SWM5 was delayed several weeks because the shi...

"Two subsea cables located in the Baltic Sea have recently reported faults. BCS East-West cable reportedly experienced a fault at 08:00 on Sunday 17th November and the C-Lion cable reportedly experienced a fault at 02:00 on Monday 18th November (times UTC).  There has been speculation and opinion shared on social media and from news outlets as to the causes of these two subsea cable faults. Many commentators have pointed towards deliberate action. However, at this stage there is no evidence to make any conclusive statement. Particularly since the Nord Stream Pipeline was damaged in 2022, the security of critical undersea infrastructure has been a central topic of discussion, and action, for both industry and government. For these and future incidents it is prudent to consider the following: -       The primary causes of cable damage in Northern European waters are commercial fishing or ship anchors, with a smaller proportion of faults...